New sample points from the past two months are substantially shifting correlations in several our past analyses of relationships between indicators and future stock returns (published updates pending). Here are some recent relevant observations from Nassim Taleb’s September 2008 essay in Edge entitled “The Fourth Quadrant: A Map of the Limits of Statistics”. In the aftermath of the collapse of Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, he observes that:
“…not only have economists been unable to prove that their models work, but no one managed to prove that the use of a model that does not work is neutral, that it does not increase blind risk taking, hence the accumulation of hidden risks.”
“…if you look long enough almost all the contribution [to statistical metrics] in some classes of variables will come from rare events…”
“Fourth Quadrant [complex payoffs from fat-tailed distributions]: …Welcome to the Black Swan domain. Here is where your limits are. Do not base your decisions on statistically based claims.”
“For rare events, the confirmation bias (the tendency…of finding samples that confirm your opinion, not those that disconfirm it) is very costly and very distorting. Why? Most of histories of Black Swan prone events is going to be Black Swan free! Most samples will not reveal the black swans except after if you are hit with them…”
“What Is Wise To Do (Or Not Do) In The Fourth Quadrant
- Avoid optimization, learn to love redundancy. …redundancy is like long an option. You certainly pay for it, but it may be necessary for survival.
- Avoid prediction of…payoffs from remote parts of the distribution. …no model should be better than just any model.
- Beware the ‘atypicality’ of remote events.
- It takes much, much longer for a time series in the Fourth Quadrant to reveal its properties. At the worst, we don’t know how long.
- Beware moral hazard…[a] series of bonuses betting on [or against] hidden risks in the Fourth Quadrant…
- [Beware] conventional metrics… [Metrics] like “standard deviation” are not stable and do not measure anything in the Fourth Quadrant. [Likewise] “linear regression“…, “Sharpe ratio“, Markowitz optimal portfolio, ANOVA…, least squares, etc.
- Where is the skewness? If we suspect right [(left)]-skewness, the true mean is more likely to be underestimated [(overestimated)] by measurement of past realizations, and the total potential is likewise poorly gauged.
- Do not confuse absence of volatility with absence of risks.
- Beware presentations of risk numbers. …risk perception is subjected to framing issues that are acute in the Fourth Quadrant.”
For elaboration, read the entire essay.
In summary, “normal” statistical metrics and associated risk management methods do not work in the realm of Black Swans (including financial markets). Redundancy, not optimization, helps manage risk in this realm.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Fourth Quadrant in statistics and risk management?
The Fourth Quadrant, as described by Nassim Taleb, is the Black Swan domain where complex payoffs combine with fat-tailed distributions. Financial markets fall into this realm, where rare events can account for almost all of the contribution to statistical metrics. Taleb argues that decisions here should not be based on statistically based claims.
Do standard statistical models work for managing risk in financial markets?
Taleb argues that normal statistical models do not work in the Fourth Quadrant, which includes financial markets, because rare events dominate outcomes. He notes that economists have not proven their models work, nor that using a model that does not work is neutral, since it may increase blind risk taking and hidden risk accumulation. His 2008 essay was written after the collapses of Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
How should investors manage risk when rare Black Swan events dominate outcomes?
Taleb recommends avoiding optimization and embracing redundancy, which he compares to being long an option: it has a cost but may be necessary for survival. He also advises avoiding prediction of payoffs from remote parts of the distribution and being wary of moral hazard, such as bonuses tied to betting on hidden risks. He adds that no model should not be treated as better than just any model, and that risk numbers should be viewed with caution because of framing issues.
Is low volatility the same as low risk in financial markets?
No, Taleb warns not to confuse absence of volatility with absence of risk in the Fourth Quadrant. Metrics like standard deviation are unstable and do not measure anything meaningful in this domain. A calm historical record can hide Black Swan risks, since most histories of Black Swan-prone events are free of Black Swans until one hits.
What are the limitations of standard deviation, Sharpe ratio and linear regression for investing?
According to Taleb, standard deviation, linear regression, the Sharpe ratio, Markowitz optimal portfolios, ANOVA and least squares are not stable and do not measure anything reliably in the Fourth Quadrant. Confirmation bias is especially costly because most samples will not reveal Black Swans, and a time series in this domain takes much longer to reveal its properties, possibly an unknown length of time. Skewness also biases estimates: if right-skewness is suspected the true mean is likely underestimated by past realizations, and if left-skewness is suspected it is likely overestimated.