Nassim Taleb’s central theme in Fooled by Randomness (the 2004 second edition) is that noise generally swamps signal (true outperformance or underperformance) in financial markets, and in life generally. A standard deviation much larger than an associated average excess return, encountered consistently in the search for outperforming investing/trading strategies, is an indicator of such swamping. The book effectively uses corollaries and examples to reinforce Nassim Taleb’s contention that past performance is neither a guarantee of future returns nor a proof of either intelligence or stupidity. Rather than recount his arguments, we focus this review on his conclusions as they relate specifically to speculating in financial markets. These conclusions are:
Ignore the Noise
From page 61:
“The opportunity cost of missing a ‘new new thing’ like the airplane or the automobile is minuscule compared to the toxicity of all the garbage one has to go through to get to these jewels. …[R]espect for the time honored provides arguments to rule out any commerce with the babbling modern journalist and implies a minimal exposure to the media as a guiding principle for someone involved in decision-making under uncertainty.”
More starkly, from pages 121-122:
“The composition of Part I [of this book] made me even more confident in my withdrawal from the media and my distancing myself from other members of the business community, mostly other investors and traders for whom I am developing more and more contempt. …[B]y withdrawing myself entirely I can have a better control of my fate.”
Play Rare Events
From page 98:
“…I try to benefit from rare events, events that do not tend to repeat themselves frequently, but, accordingly, present a large payoff when they occur. I try to make money infrequently, as infrequently as possible, simply because I believe that rare events are not fairly valued, and that the rarer the event, the more undervalued it will be in price…; I think that the counterintuitive aspect of the trade (and the fact that our emotional wiring does not accommodate it) gives me some form of advantage.”
From page 106:
“In the markets, there is a category or traders who have inverse rare events, for whom volatility is often a bearer of good news. These traders lose money frequently, but in small amounts, and make money rarely, but in large amounts. I call them crisis hunters. I am happy to be one of them.”
How to Play
From page 112:
“…I buy [out-of-the-money options] for a living (by selling an out-of-the-money option one is betting that an event will not happen; by buying one I am merely betting that it may happen). …I prefer a lumpy and rare payoff.”
From page 121:
“…I will use statistics and inductive methods to make aggressive bets, but I will not use them to manage my risks and exposures. Surprisingly, all the surviving traders I know seem to have done the same. They trade on ideas based on some observation (that includes past history) but…they make sure that the costs of being wrong are limited (and their probability is not derived from past data)… {T]hey know before getting involved in the trading strategy which events would prove their conjecture wrong and allow for it… They would then terminate their trade. This is called a stop loss, a predetermined exit point, a protection from the black swan.”
From page 197:
“I have a trick to know if something real in the world is taking place… The trick is to look only at the large percentage changes. Unless something moves by more than its usual daily percentage change, the event is deemed to be noise… In addition, the interpretation is not linear; a 2% move is not twice as significant an event as 1%, it is rather like four to ten times. A 7% move can be several billion times more relevant than a 1% move!”
From page 214:
“Since my heart does not seem to agree with my brain, I need to take serious action to avoid making irrational trading decisions, namely, by denying myself access to my performance report unless it hits a predetermined threshold.”
The book offers no discussion of how to identify rare event opportunities, or any quantitative analysis showing that Nassim Taleb’s strategy/tactics of speculating on rare events generates excess returns.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does it mean when noise swamps signal in financial markets?
Noise swamping signal means random variation overwhelms true outperformance or underperformance in market returns. Nassim Taleb's indicator is a standard deviation much larger than the associated average excess return, which he says investors encounter consistently when searching for outperforming strategies. Under this view, past performance neither guarantees future returns nor proves intelligence or stupidity.
Does speculating on rare events with out-of-the-money options generate excess returns?
Speculating on rare events with out-of-the-money options has no quantitative evidence of generating excess returns in Taleb's Fooled by Randomness. Taleb argues rare events are undervalued in price, and the rarer the event, the more undervalued. The book offers only a theoretical rationale and no quantitative analysis showing the strategy outperforms.
How do stop losses and out-of-the-money options limit risk in a rare event trading strategy?
In Taleb's approach, a trader buys out-of-the-money options so the loss is limited to the premium paid while accepting a lumpy, rare, large payoff. Traders also set a stop loss, a predetermined exit point defined before entering the trade by the events that would prove the conjecture wrong. Taleb says he uses statistics and inductive methods for aggressive bets but not to manage risks, and that the cost of being wrong should not be derived from past data.
How does a crisis hunter trader differ from a trader who makes small frequent gains?
A crisis hunter, in Taleb's description, loses money frequently in small amounts and makes money rarely in large amounts, so volatility is often good news. This is the inverse of traders who profit frequently in small amounts and are exposed to rare large losses, such as sellers of out-of-the-money options who bet an event will not happen. Taleb says he prefers the lumpy, rare payoff and counts himself a crisis hunter.
What are the limitations of Taleb's rare event speculation strategy?
Taleb's rare event speculation strategy lacks any guidance on how to identify rare event opportunities in Fooled by Randomness. The book also provides no quantitative analysis showing the strategy generates excess returns, so the claims remain theoretical. The strategy also implies frequent small losses, which Taleb admits conflict emotionally with rational decision-making, leading him to deny himself access to performance reports unless a predetermined threshold is hit.