What is a financial market anomaly? How can investors determine whether an apparent anomaly is real (economically material)? In his March 2011 book chapter entitled “Perspectives on Capital Market Anomalies”, Mozaffar Khan provides a framework for interpreting academic research on anomalies and evaluating the exploitability of specific anomalies. His context is market efficiency: “Respect for the efficient markets theory, and an acknowledgment that it sometimes fails (i.e., that mispriced stocks can be identified), can coexist.” Key points are:
- Anomalies are deviations from efficient markets theory, manifested as predictable non-zero risk-adjusted returns.
- The typical approach for evaluating anomaly alpha is to: (1) rank stocks into (for example) deciles based on some historical firm or stock characteristic; (2) calculate the future return for a portfolio that is long the extreme outperforming decile and short the extreme underperforming decile; and, (3) debit this raw future by the expected return based on the risk of the portfolio (as specified by a risk adjustment model such as the Fama-French three-factor model).
- While many academic studies do not, practitioners must debit information, search and trading costs from the alpha to assess anomaly exploitability.
- The statistical reliability of an anomaly measures the level of assurance that its alpha differs from zero, with at least 95% assurance a typical criterion. Generally, if the variability of alpha over time is small compared to its average value, the associated anomaly is reliable. Uncertainties that confound determination of alpha reliability include:
- The risk adjustment model may be defective, thereby either exposing false alphas or obscuring real ones.
- The statistical tests used to assess alpha reliability may be defective (as evidenced by conflicts with alternative tests), perhaps because they have some built-in bias or they are unsuitable for the anomaly return distribution.
- A discovered alpha may be a lucky result of intensive in-sample data snooping, either directly by the immediate researcher or indirectly by follow-up researchers using the same data. Luck is unlikely to persist out of sample. Tying the result conceptually to an otherwise testable economic rationale helps mitigate data snooping bias.
- Major competing explanatory frameworks for anomalies (often difficult to distinguish empirically) are:
- Investors lacking complete information about asset valuation parameters and/or being otherwise uncertain about them may rationally misprice associated assets.
- Inherent investor behavioral and cognitive biases (such as emotional sentiment, overconfidence, self-attribution, conservatism and representativeness) may generate mispricings via underreactions and overreactions to information. Obstacles to market efficiency such as transaction costs, short sale constraints, absence of close substitutes and non-scalability may allow such mispricings to persist.
In summary, the typical process for evaluating the exploitability of financial market anomalies invokes a range of uncertainties that undermine investor confidence in associated implementation strategies.
The author does not address in this book chapter:
- Potential asset return distribution wildness (susceptibility to Black Swans) and consequent statistical intractability.
- The extreme difficulty of addressing trading frictions, which vary considerably over time, across assets and among investors.
- Potential market adaptation to publicly known anomalies over time.
Compare and contrast this overview with that presented in “Investing Demons”.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a financial market anomaly?
A financial market anomaly is a deviation from efficient markets theory, shown as a predictable, non-zero risk-adjusted return (alpha). In Mozaffar Khan's framework, anomalies are consistent with the idea that markets are generally efficient but that mispriced stocks can sometimes be identified.
Can investors rely on market anomalies to earn exploitable returns?
Market anomalies cannot be relied on with confidence, according to Khan's framework, because a range of uncertainties undermines investor trust in implementation strategies. Alpha must be net of information, search and trading costs, and statistical reliability typically requires at least 95% assurance that alpha differs from zero. Risk model defects, flawed statistical tests and data snooping can all produce false or obscured alphas.
How do researchers test whether a market anomaly generates alpha?
Researchers test anomaly alpha by ranking stocks into deciles on a historical firm or stock characteristic, then calculating the future return of a portfolio long the top-performing decile and short the bottom-performing decile. They then subtract the expected return implied by portfolio risk, using a risk adjustment model such as the Fama-French three-factor model. Practitioners should also deduct information, search and trading costs, which many academic studies omit.
Are market anomalies caused by risk, investor behavior, or market frictions?
Khan describes three major competing explanations for anomalies, which are often hard to distinguish empirically. The first is that investors with incomplete or uncertain information about valuation parameters may rationally misprice assets. The second is that behavioral and cognitive biases such as overconfidence, sentiment and conservatism cause underreactions and overreactions. The third is that obstacles such as transaction costs, short sale constraints, lack of close substitutes and non-scalability let mispricings persist.
What are the limitations and risks of evaluating market anomalies?
Evaluating market anomalies is limited by possibly defective risk adjustment models, unreliable statistical tests, and data snooping bias, where a lucky in-sample result is unlikely to persist out of sample. Linking a result to a testable economic rationale helps reduce data snooping. Khan's chapter does not address return distribution wildness (Black Swans), the difficulty of modeling time-varying trading frictions, or market adaptation to publicly known anomalies.