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A Few Notes on The Halo Effect

Steve LeCompte | | Posted in: Fundamental Valuation, Sentiment Indicators

Key Insight

Rosenzweig argues media sentiment reflects past performance rather than fundamentals, with "excellent" companies from In Search of Excellence showing only 12 of 35 outperforming S&P 500 (1980-1984; post-publication returns).

In his 2007 book, The Halo Effect …and Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers, Phil Rosenzweig argues for distinguishing carefully between sentiments (halos) derived principally from past bottom-line performance and fundamentals independent from that performance when assessing the excellence of companies and managers. Sentiments are essentially opinions expressed via “managers’ ex post facto recollections, company statements, and articles from the business press.” The distinction between sentimental and fundamental is important for investors/traders, as are his related conclusions about the value of experts and the inherent unpredictability of firm performance. Based on his review of prominent past studies of business excellence, he finds that:

From page 34:

“There’s a natural tendency, even at leading publications such as Fortune and Business Week, to exaggerate highs and lows, and to rely on simple phrases to explain a company’s performance…these journalistic accounts become the primary sources for later studies.”

In other words, the media employs mostly sentimental shortcuts in assessing company performance, and the sentiments expressed are much more reflective of past trends than future performance.

From pages 86, 98 and 105:

During the five years (1980-1984) after publication of the sentiment-based In Search of Excellence by Tom Peters and Bob Waterman, only 12 of the 35 publicly traded “excellent” companies outperformed the S&P 500 index. And, 30 of these 35 companies showed a decline in profitability (operating income as a percentage of total assets) over this period. During the ten years (1980-1989) after publication, only 13 of these 35 companies outperformed the S&P 500 index.

During the five years (1991-1995) after completion of research for the sentiment-based Built to Last by Jim Collins and Jerry Porras, only eight of 17 publicly traded “visionary” companies (so identified in the book based on extraordinary past performance) outperformed the S&P 500 index. And, only five of 17 improved their profitability over this period. During 1991-2000, only six of 16 publicly traded and surviving “visionary” companies outperformed the S&P 500 index. Moreover, 12 publicly traded “comparison” companies (so identified in the book based on good but not extraordinary past performance) outperformed their “visionary” counterparts.

“Suggesting that companies can follow a blueprint to lasting success may be appealing, but it’s not supported by the evidence.”

In other words, measures of sentiment may tell good stories, but they appear to lack predictive power.

From pages 138-139:

“Our desire to tell stories, to provide a coherent direction to events, may also cause us to see trends that do not exist or infer causes incorrectly. We may ignore facts because they don’t fit into our story.”

“…[C]ompanies that have outperformed the market for long periods of time are not just rare, they are statistical artifacts that are observable only in retrospect.”

“We may look at a handful of extraordinarily successful companies and imagine that doing what they did can lead to success, when it might in fact lead mainly to higher volatility and a lower overall chance of success.”

In other words, simplified frameworks for explaining the past are probably less useful for prediction than dispassionate statistical analyses.

From pages 173-174, some points to remember:

“If independent variables aren’t measured independently, we may find ourselves standing hip-deep in Halos.”

“If the data are full of Halos, it doesn’t matter how much we’ve gathered or how sophisticated our analysis appears to be.”

“Success rarely lasts as long as we’d like – for the most part, long-term success is a delusion based on selection after the fact.”

“Any good strategy involves risk. If you think your strategy is foolproof, the fool may well be you.”

“Chance often plays a greater role than we think…”

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the halo effect in business and investing?

The halo effect in business is the tendency to judge a company or its managers as excellent based on sentiments derived mainly from past bottom-line performance rather than independent fundamentals. In Phil Rosenzweig's 2007 book, these sentiments appear as managers' ex post facto recollections, company statements, and business press articles. Distinguishing sentiment from fundamentals matters for investors and traders.

Do companies labeled excellent by business books keep outperforming the stock market?

Companies labeled excellent by business books generally did not keep outperforming the market in the cases Rosenzweig reviewed. In the five years after In Search of Excellence was published (1980-1984), only 12 of 35 publicly traded "excellent" companies beat the S&P 500, and 30 of 35 saw profitability decline. For Built to Last, only eight of 17 "visionary" companies outperformed in 1991-1995, and only six of 16 in 1991-2000.

How can you test whether a company's reputation for excellence predicts future performance?

Rosenzweig's approach compares the post-publication stock returns and profitability of companies named excellent in prominent business studies against the S&P 500 index. Profitability was measured as operating income as a percentage of total assets. For example, he tracked 35 "excellent" companies over 1980-1984 and 1980-1989, and 17 "visionary" companies over 1991-1995, with comparison companies used in the Built to Last case.

Are sentiment-based measures of company quality the same as fundamentals-based analysis?

Sentiment-based measures of company quality are not the same as fundamentals; sentiments derive principally from past performance, while fundamentals are independent of it. Rosenzweig finds sentiments, such as business press accounts, reflect past trends more than future performance and tend to lack predictive power. He suggests dispassionate statistical analyses are probably more useful for prediction than simplified frameworks that explain the past.

Why is it risky to copy the strategies of highly successful companies?

Copying the strategies of highly successful companies is risky because, per Rosenzweig, long-term outperformance is rare and often a statistical artifact visible only in retrospect. Imitating a handful of extraordinary winners may lead mainly to higher volatility and a lower overall chance of success. He also notes that chance plays a greater role than we think, and that data full of halos undermines analysis regardless of how much data is gathered or how sophisticated the method.

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