Big Ideas
We intend that the entries in this blog convey ideas and research results of lasting value. These blog entries offer some big ideas relevant to investing and trading.
Tools to Tackle Non-normality? July 4, 2010
A reader commented and asked: “I frequently read that stock prices are not normally distributed, and that by assuming they are, an investor will tend to underestimate market risk. One paper I read says their distribution is leptokurtic, a distribution that has a more acute peak around the mean (that is, a higher probability than More…
Reversion of Stock Markets to Value Over the Long Run June 23, 2010
…evidence of stock market reversion to a valuation benchmark, and the speed of any reversion detected, derive substantially from the choice of sample period.
Underestimation of Wildness? April 29, 2010
In the opening paragraphs of his April 2010 article entitled “Traditional vs. Behavioral Finance”, Robert Bloomfield handicaps his subject contest as follows: “The traditional finance researcher sees financial settings populated not by the error-prone and emotional Homo sapiens, but by the awesome Homo economicus. The latter makes perfectly rational decisions, applies unlimited processing power to More…
Trading Frictions Over the Long Run April 28, 2010
…trading frictions for large-capitalization U.S. stocks are much higher for most of the 20th century than they have been over the past 20 years. These frictions may be material in deriving exploitable trends or anomalies from long-run series.
Credit Ratings and Stock Return Anomalies April 23, 2010
…evidence indicates that many (but not all) well-known stock return anomalies derive their profitability from short positions in firms with low credit ratings during deteriorating credit conditions, with shorting constraints and illiquidity limiting exploitation.
In Search of Super-anomalies April 5, 2010
…investors may be able to streamline the search for anomalous returns by focusing on two factors: (1) firm size, representing the rational risk of failure; and, (2) a seasonal factor related to operating profit and buybacks-secondaries, representing irrational mispricing.
Any Combination Strategies? March 29, 2010
The best way to find other combinations on the site is probably to scan the summary conclusions by category via the links in the header.
A Long Run Demographic Stock Market Outlook March 23, 2010
…demographic projections suggest a reasonably stable long run real U.S. stock market return over the next 40 years.
Beat the Market with Hot-Anomaly Switching? March 22, 2010
…evidence indicates that a trader who periodically switches to the hottest known anomaly based on a rolling window of past performance may be able to beat the market. Anomalies appear to have their own kind of momentum.
Diversifying Across Equity Anomalies March 16, 2010
…evidence from nearly six decades of data indicates that diversifying across stock return anomalies consistently beats individual anomalies and the broad stock market.
Managing Investment Risk by Parsing Uncertainties March 9, 2010
…identifying and addressing appropriately the range of uncertainties found in financial markets is essential to investing success.
Perspectives on Global Equity Diversification March 8, 2010
…evidence from 1950-2008 indicates that global diversification, while providing little protection on average from local market crashes, offers considerable risk mitigation over the long run.
Unfooled by Randomness? March 2, 2010
…experimental evidence indicates that people, whether expert in finance or not, can quickly learn to distinguish financial markets time series from randomized data with high reliability via simple inference.
The 2000s: A Market Timer’s Decade? February 8, 2010
…any long-only timer of the U.S. stock market who did not beat the market during 2000-2009 has some explaining to do.
Variation in Long-run Stock Market Predictability February 2, 2010
…evidence indicates that U.S. stock market returns may be significantly predictable during economic and political crises, but not during market bubbles and crashes. Investor misreaction to crises, not economic fundamentals, appear to drive stock return predictability.


