Investing Expertise

The sponsors of retirement/endowment plans (public and corporate pension plans, unions, foundations and endowments) retain professionals to manage their funds. Do their decisions to hire and fire such professionals pan out? In other words, do their plans outperform the market after they change managers? In their May 2006 paper entitled “The Selection and Termination of Investment Management Firms by Plan Sponsors”, Amit Goyal and Sunil Wahal examine this question. Using data for 8,204/910 hiring/firing decisions by 3,591 plan sponsors during 1994-2003, they conclude that: Keep Reading

Readers recently requested evaluations of two different retail investment managers. Our reviews involve simply putting the information the firms make available on their web sites into the context of broad stock market research. Our findings for the two firms are similar, as follows: Keep Reading

How well do experts perform in timing individual stock trades? In their May 2007 paper entitled “Individual Security Timing Ability and Fund Manager Performance”, David Gallagher, Andrew Ross and Peter Swan define individual security timing ability as the proportion of potential returns obtained by a trader over the holding period and measure this ability for a set of active Australian equity fund managers. Using a unique database of daily trades and monthly portfolio holdings for 30 fund managers from January 1996 through December 2001, they conclude that: Keep Reading

How does “the group that is arguably best qualified, finance professors, …assess the importance of valuation techniques, asset-pricing models, market anomalies, firm characteristics, corporate events, seasonal variables, and other information” when they invest for themselves? In their April 2007 paper entitled “What Really Matters When Buying and Selling Stocks?”, James Doran and Colby Wright seek to answer this question via an email-initiated electronic survey of 4,525 finance professors at accredited U.S. universities and colleges. Using data provided by 642 qualified respondents, all with Ph.D.’s, they conclude that: Keep Reading

Are stock market forecasters prone to hyperbole? Is there logic to predicting plunges and melt-ups at probabilities unjustified by rigorous empirical analysis? In their February 2007 paper entitled “Probability Elicitation, Scoring Rules, and Competition among Forecasters”, Kenneth Lichtendahl, Jr. and Robert Winkler apply game theory to model the behavior of forecasters who pit themselves not only against the data, but also against each other. In other words, they examine the logical behavior of a forecaster whose reward depends not only on own accuracy but also on the accuracies of competing forecasters. When forecasters compete, they conclude that: Keep Reading

Are hedge fund managers the best and brightest when it comes to stock picking and market timing? In their March 2007 paper entitled “How Smart are the Smart Guys? A Unique View from Hedge Fund Stock Holdings”, John Griffin and Jin Xu investigate whether hedge fund managers are better at picking stocks and investing styles than mutual fund managers. Using the stock holdings of 306 hedge fund companies from 1980 to 2004 as reported in quarterly SEC Form 13F equity filings, they conclude that: Keep Reading

How do analyst earnings forecasts vary across financial reporting periods? Does the desire of analysts to maintain a good relationship with firm management affect earnings forecasts? In their February 2007 paper entitled “Relationship Incentives and the Optimistic/Pessimistic Pattern in Analysts’ Forecasts”, Robert Libby, James Hunton, Hun-Tong Tan and Nicholas Seybert report the results of controlled blind experiments involving experienced sell-side financial analysts that address these questions. Using information gained from “training sessions” for a group of 47 analysts from a single large investment banking/brokerage firm and 34 analysts from a medium-sized regional brokerage firm, they conclude that: Keep Reading

Suppose quack financial advisors offered their services to naive investors. What would happen? In the December 2005 version of his paper entitled “The Market for Quacks”, Ran Spiegler applies game theory to a scenario that fits by analogy. He imagines a group of “quacks” in a price competition to attract and retain “patients” who recover with some probability, regardless of whether they pay a quack for “treatment.” If the patients were rational, they would induce that the quack services are worthless and would acquire none. However, if the patients succumb to anecdotal evidence (random, casual stories rather than statistically reliable analyses), he deduces that: Keep Reading

Are the most admired companies the best investments? Or, is current state of admiration a contrarian indicator for future returns? In their February 2007 paper entitled “Stocks of Admired Companies and Despised Ones”, Deniz Anginer, Kenneth Fisher and Meir Statman test these hypotheses. The authors define state of admiration using Fortune magazine’s annual survey-based lists of “America’s Most Admired Companies.” Survey respondents are senior executives, directors and securities analysts, and the questions asked seemingly relate indirectly or directly to the investment value of the companies named. Using these lists for April 1983 (survey inception) through March 2006, associated stock return data and a separate survey of high-net worth investors, they conclude that: Keep Reading

When the market trend challenges their beliefs, what do we hear from market “experts?” Keep Reading