Objective research and reviews to aid investing decisions
Investors might suppose that a company repurchases shares when firm officers believe that the market is undervaluing its stock. Since these officers are highly informed, the stock is subsequently likely to outperform the market. How could executives be sure that their company's stock is undervalued? In their November 2006 paper entitled "Earnings Management and Firm Performance Following Open-market Repurchases", Guojin Gong, Henock Louis and Amy Sun investigate whether company management orchestrates stock undervaluation through earnings management (abnormal accruals) prior to executing share repurchases. Using financial and stock price data over the period 1984-2002 (1,720 open-market repurchase announcements that are followed by actual repurchases), they conclude that:
The following chart, taken from the paper, shows unadjusted and adjusted abnormal accruals by quarter from two years before to two years after a subsequently implemented repurchase announcement. Adjusted accruals account for any unique accrual behaviors of similar companies. Results suggest that, on average, company officers exploit latitude with accruals to depress reported earnings just prior to announcing open market stock buybacks.

In summary, prior downward management of earnings (via accruals) is one reason that firms repurchasing shares generate subsequent abnormal stock returns.
So maybe stock repurchases, leveraged via earnings management, offer informed shareholders more bang-for-the-buck than dividends in terms of ultimate stock returns?
For related research, see Blog Synthesis: Buybacks and Secondaries.